Courage and Conviction

Another topic that is linked to the disparity between Roochnik and Curd is the broader implications for the selection of any text book for any class. It seems that most any text book, given certain subject matter, presents information from the standpoint of the author. While some take greater care than others to present an unbiased or objective position, to some extent it seems inevitable that the author’s opinion is represented in the material.

This bias seems to depend extensively on the material. In mathematics, it is harder, or perhaps impossible to present a biased or non-objective take on a proof or some concept. It is inherently checkable and objectively right or wrong. This seems to also be the case for many sciences. However, there definitely are subjective judgments within these fields. For example in physics, there is some debate about the viability of string theory or a theory of everything, as has been proposed. It seems possible that an author could promote either position based on their subjective opinion. However, even here there is some standard, be it internal coherence, predictive power, or scientific rigor, etc. This kind of objectivity is not available in much of the humanities, philosophy included. Here there can be several viable interpretations, outlooks, etc. for historical philosophical thought. As is the case with Roochnik, we can view ancient philosophy as a dialectical progression, or perhaps simply as a series of unrelated, or non-progressive thinkers.

Given this variability, it seems absolutely necessary that any student or reader approach every text critically and cautiously, especially when first being exposed to the material. Indeed, it is easy to read Roochnik’s interpretation and then read the fragments and find his interpretation. It is another to read the fragments and original material, collect one’s own opinions and then temper those against Roochnik’s.

This critical approach seems to be necessary in many other fields, not simply philosophy. In Economics for example, there are countless “summarizations” and “formulations” of the thought of Keynes, Adam Smith, or even Marx. In each, there seems to be a bias that skews the original material, whether to fit certain circumstances or the authors own opinion. In either case, the original material is important because it allows us to explore what was actually said, rather than what someone tells us was said.

It is interesting to think about the way we have been exposed to ideas, particularly new ideas with which we are novices. Usually we rely on someone, whether a professor, teacher, or author who has more experience in the given field, to guide our exploration of the material. It is important to realize that these people have their own incentives, opinions, and interpretations vis-à-vis what they are presenting, and that we should have the intellectual courage to branch out on our own, read the original material, and not be afraid to formulate an interpretation at odds with what we have been exposed to.

Roochnik's Dangerous Idea

So it has been about a month, and I suppose it’s time for another post, or two. For some time I have been intrigued by the selection of text books for our ancient philosophy class, that is the two main texts, Curd and Roochnik. These are very different from one another and their disparity brings up two interesting topics.

The first is the extent to which Roochnik is presenting an implicit view of the ancients that is smuggled in by the way he organizes his presentation of the material. So far as we have read, Roochnik is viewing the ancients as a linear progression of thought that builds and progresses based on the thinking of each subsequent philosopher. This is apparent in his transitions between philosophers and the framing that he offers between their thought. Not only does he link between the Milesians, which is perhaps less tenuous, but also between completely disparate thinkers including Hesiod and Thales, Heraclitus and Parmenides, etc. This methodology contains implicit assumptions which Roochnik fails to address and in some ways biases his presentation for those who fail to read cautiously.

First, this assumes that indeed there is some progress to the history of ancient philosophical thought. This claim is addressed briefly by Roochnik in his introduction. He claims that he is presenting the material in a chronological and dialectical fashion. Here the dialectical refers to a conversation which describes the evolution of ancient thought. It is this dialectical process which suggests progress though history. Roochnik’s claim seems to rely on the assumption that there was indeed contact between thinkers in antiquity and that they were able to understand their predecessors. While this assumption seems probable in certain cases, i.e. the Milesians, it seems untenable in others, viz. between Heraclitus and Parmenides. Since Roochnik does not offer any real evidence for the transmission of thought among these philosophers, and given the relative timetable of some thinkers, it seems very probable that the dialectical process or conversation between philosophers described by Roochnik breaks down.

Another point of contention is the notion of progress though history. It seems only fitting to refer to Nietzsche and this point. “That the great moments in the struggle of individuals form a chain, that in them the high points of humanity are linked throughout millennia, that which is highest in such a moment of the distant past be for me still alive, bright and great – this is the fundamental thought of the faith of humanity which is expressed in the demand for monumental history.” While it is possible to view history as progressive, indeed there are certain elements of this illustrated in the Milesians, a more compelling overarching view seems to me, to be that presented by Nietzsche. “No, the goal of humanity cannot lie at the end but only in its highest specimens.”

Second, viewing the history of ancient philosophical thought as a progression, corners one’s interpretations within a dogmatic framework. That is, in order to tell a compelling story of the progression of ancient thought, Roochnik must commit himself to certain interpretations of each philosophers thought. In this case, Roochnik is making his reading of a philosopher fit his system or overarching goal of the progress in ancient thought. This seems dishonest since Roochnik is not necessarily presenting the most compelling, reasoned, or accurate reading, but merely one which “fits the story”.