The point at issue is the extent to which each philosopher saw himself as breaking from tradition and contemporary thinking. It seems too often we revere tradition or authority to the extent that we see our ideas not in their own terms, but in terms of the tradition. We are afraid to break with established claims and hence hedge our ideas on reinterpretation or exegetical philosophizing. True philosophy begins when we can clearly state our ideas, differentiate ourselves from tradition, and not second guess ourselves when we find that we are in opposition to tradition or contemporary authority. To do philosophy, we cannot be unsettled to find that we are heretics.
Friday, March 12, 2010
Heresy among the ancients
For the majority of the past week I have been working on my senior thesis which deals with Nietzsche and Walter Kaufmann. While doing a bit of research I actually stumbled across a discussion of many of the ancient thinkers that we have covered heretofore in class. Kaufmann’s discussion is interesting insofar is it highlights an aspect of ancient thinking that perhaps has been glossed over, and which offers a unique characterization of what it means to do philosophy. Kaufmann’s contention is that these ancient thinkers were heretics. That is, their thinking “not only opposed the common sense of their time and some of the most revered names of the past but they did not presume to speak in the name of the Lord or to interpret correctly a previously misunderstood tradition. They pitted their own thinking against the religion and the poetry they knew. And by breaking the exegetic mode of thought and every other form of appeal to authority, they initiated philosophy.” The radical departure from the past that each of the ancient thinkers presents is in a sense very refreshing. It is extraordinarily unique and perhaps not the same kind of philosophy that is done today. In the case of the Milesians, how easy would it have been to reinterpret Thales, or Anaximander, in order to make Anaximenes point, rather than saying, “No, the arche is not water, but x substance.”
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Matt,
ReplyDeleteYet another great post! I'd love to hear about what you are doing in your thesis, as I have an long, ongoing interest in Nietzsche.
A couple of thoughts on your post.
First, do you think Kauffmann has overstated the heretics case? I'm thinking of Parmenides' involvement in the traditions of Apollo, or of his (and Xenophanes'?) advancing of the mytho-poetic tradition. Or consider Anaximenes' taking up of a Milesian tradition and its key problems, and advancing things by virtue of engagement with that intellectual tradition.
Second, your last paragraph reminds me of Alasdair MacIntyre's claim that we always see and understand our ideas (and philosophize) from within either a coherent tradition, or from fragmented pieces of various traditions. On this view, all philosophical thought will always already be operating within some tradition (or pieces of traditions) or another, and the trick is to find out how to articulate and advance tradition-constituted modes of inquiry, while performing immanent critiques of competing traditions.
Consider the notion that the philosopher stands at an Archimedean point outside all traditions, but is ever in danger of being unduly influenced by them. This view itself is the product of the (rather incoherent) tradition of Enlightenment individualism. Is that the tradition philosophers need to be committed to? Maybe so, but I for one don't think so.
So I find myself in agreement with MacIntyre. The goal is not to find out how to be radical heretics, but how to be orthodox adherents of a tradition of inquiry. That is, by taking the incoherent pieces of traditions and stories in which we find ourselves already embedded, and try to philosophically commit ourselves to a coherent tradition of inquiry. And good traditions have always been not those which drudgingly keep the status quo, but are dynamically advancing and arguing over the tradition's own truth claims about life and reality.
Very good post, and I look forward to your comments! (and your thesis thoughts... pull me aside after class sometime)
Nathan,
ReplyDeletethanks for the feedback, you raise some intriguing questions.
First I am not sure that Kaufmann overstates his case here. Granted he is lumping a group of pretty disparate ancient thinkers into his conception - and it seems that he particularly has Heraclitus in mind. However, I think the label of heretic still applies to Parmenides and Xenophanes. Both articulate new ideas and differentiate themselves from their predecessors, even if they employ traditional presentations of their ideas, i.e. in the mytho-poetic style. Further, I think Kaufmann's main point is that these thinkers didn't try to hide their ideas, or let themselves be overshadowed by their traditional inheritance.
Second, I have not read MacIntyre, but based on your comments it seems to me that indeed, we are all within a tradition of a sort, insofar as the way we have learned philosophy and our experience contribute to a specific understanding of it. However, I am not convinced that we must be adherents within a tradition of inquiry. It seems like a tradition can have systematic limitations. That is, not everything is possible, but the philosopher is limited by the tradition and the way the tradition has cast issues over the course of its evolution. Hence while the status quo is not maintained within a given system, its dynamic advancement is constrained.
I am not sure that is possible to liberate oneself from all traditions, just as it seems impossible to ever truly attain an objective stance outside of all traditions. The way we are taught philosophy and our unique experiences and perspective all contribute to preclude this kind of objectivity. However, even if we are constrained within a single tradition we should not shrink from breaking the mold, and being heretics. I think this is Kaufmann's point, we shouldn't necessarily aim to be heretics, but we should not be unsettled to find that we are heretics. Indeed, there is good work that can be done within tradition inquiry, as you say, but I don't think we should limit ourselves to this only.
very interesting debate. I agree with you and buy the idea of "not to be unsettled to find ourselves heretics". We cannot do philosophy and thinking without the influence of our tradition and preexisting education, but in doing philosophy we should be prepared for any "unintended" discoveries and heretically revolutionary thought, as long as the philosopher believes them to be truth. That's why great philosopher can always come up with ideas for the future generations, not just traditional or local audience.
ReplyDeleteI'm going to throw my hat in (moderated) support of tradition. It does not seem to me that the philosopher who fearless rejects his tradition is inherently doing philosophy better than one who cautiously allows his tradition to critique his conclusions. It seems that we must at the very least fill in exactly what traditions we are talking about.
ReplyDeleteIt also seems that there are at least two advantages the latter philosopher has over the former (the former may well have some over the latter as well). 1) There's a sense in which the latter is more honest than the former; he recognizes exactly where he is coming and what influence his tradition plays is his thought. He suffers under no illusory independence. 2) The tradition is probably smarter than he is. If you disagree with, say Aristotle, there's fairly good reason to think it's you and not he that has erred. How much more so is this the case when you have a tradition that has been building upon multiple great thinkers for a significant period of time?
I think you make a good argument Ray. Although I have never liked the emphasis that if disagreement arises between you and a 'great thinker' from tradition, then it is probably you that have erred (perhaps it is just the rebel in me).
ReplyDelete@ Matt: I think we can agree that there's a middle line to walk here. One shouldn't disregard their own opinions simply because you disagree with a great thinker at least not always. At the same time one shouldn't remain committed to one's opinions just because you thought them up (as you probably known this is a very Nietzschean idea). Exactly where is this line? I think we can also agree that is hard to say.
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